Mathematical lectures by Weyl, Hermann, 1885-1955
MATHEMATICAL LECTURES 
I 
CONSISTENCY IN MATHEMATICS 
T H E R E  are two circumstances which formally evoke the 
danger of contradiction within the system of mathe- 
matical propositions, because they prevent these proposi- 
tions from being significant statements, in the sense tha t  
we know what we mean by asking whether they are true 
or false. The one circumstance, as Brouwer first made clear, 
is the unlimited application of the terms “all” and “any” 
t o  a field of mere possibilities which is open to  infinity; the 
other is the leveling process which mathematics blindly per- 
formed on the Russell types. Especially with regard t o  the 
second point, mathematics manifests its full participation 
in the servile revolt of the positive sciences against philoso- 
phy, the revolt of the anti-spiritual mind, with its demo- 
cratic leveling process, against the spiritual mind and its 
hierarchic structure, which changed the question : “What is 
your intrinsic nature and what does this nature bring forth ?” 
into the other: “What can you be used for? What profit do 
you yield when you are made t o  play your part in the 
process of production standardized by such and such 
axioms ?” Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics represents 
the restoration of mind to  its old and sacred rights. Hilbert’s 
formalized mathematics, however, undertakes to  show tha t  
1 Lectures delivered at the Rice Institute, May 20,22, and 23, 1929, by Hermann 
Weyl, Professor of Mathematics at the Technische Hochschule in Zurich. 
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the opposite party, which indeed sinks far below the mind 
when i t  demands tha t  its overflowing wealth of “results” 
be accepted as literally true, is ultimately right in spite of 
all-ultimately, however, meaning: before a transcendental 
forum which we realize symbolically. I n  mathematics the 
inquiry into the genuineness or non-genuineness of the inner 
working of our entire western culture urges towards a more 
rigorous decision than can be attained in the other hazier 
fields of knowledge. 
With regard to  the first point, the usage of the terms “all” 
and “any,” I think one does not hit quite the right spot by 
referring t o  the  validity or invalidity of the principle of the 
excluded middle. As you know, the point in question is the 
confrontation of the two assertions: “Being given a set M 
of objects, there exists an element in M with the property 
3” and “All elements of the set M have the property non-8.” 
But the stress is not on the fact that  two assertions are con- 
fronted one of which occurs as the negation of the other, but 
on the fact that  these assertions involve the terms “there 
exists” and “all.” Moreover, i t  is incorrect to describe the 
intuitionistic point of view by saying that  the tertium non 
datur applies or does not apply in the case referred to, ac- 
cording as M is a finite or an infinite set. The  issue does not 
lie in the  distinction between finite and infinite, but it de- 
pends on whether M is given as an aggregate of objects 
which are individually exhibited, one by one (and is there- 
fore indeed finite), or not. If several pieces of chalk lie in 
front of me, the assertion: “All these pieces are white” is 
merely an abbreviation for the assertion: “This piece is 
white, and this piece is white, and * . . ” (while I exhibit 
them one by one); likewise “There exists among them one 
red one” is an abbreviated expression for: “This one is red, 
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or this one is red, or . .” But such an interpretation is 
possible only for sets the elements of which are exhibited. 
If, in opposition to the given example, we take the sequence 
of natural numbers 1, 2, 3,  . . and consider an assertion 
such as “All numbers are even,” the analogous interpretation 
leads to  an infinite logical product (I put the logical “and” 
and “or” into analogy with the arithmetical x and +): 
1 is even, and 2 is even, and 3 is even, - . But this ob- 
viously has no meaning. Wherever a general proposition of 
this kind occurs, i t  has a hypothetical meaning, i t  assures 
that if you are given any definite number, for example 18, 
you are certain of the correctness of the judgment that  18 
is an even number. It is evidently impossible and without 
meaning to  negate such a hypothetical proposition. This 
fact that  the negation cannot be carried out, and not the 
invalidity of the tertium non datur, is the point on which the 
matter hinges. The formal negation of our general judgment: 
“there is an odd number” would be equivalent t o  an infinite 
logical sum: 1 is odd, or 2 is odd, or ; it gains significance 
only with a view to the explicit construction of an individual 
definite number, for example 17, which is established to  be 
odd. I have therefore called the existential proposition an 
abstract of judgment. If knowledge is a valuable treasure, 
I compare this abstract to a paper which informs us of the 
existence of a treasure but without disclosing where it lies. 
With regard to  the transition from finite logical sums and 
products t o  infinite ones, matters stand much the same as 
in the domain of arithmetical operations, where the defini- 
tion of a finite sum does not a priori determine the meaning 
of an infinite sum. 
I do not want t o  go into too much discussion to  convert 
you to  this opinion of Brouwer’s. It is entirely a matter of 
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reflection (Besinnung),’ which has nothing to do with any 
epistemological, or perhaps even metaphysical theories, nor 
indeed with any arbitrarily declared mathematical axioms 
and their technical manipulation. Everybody will admit 
its truth provided he understands it. 
In  the development of arithmetic, we can perhaps dis- 
tinguish four stages with regard to  the part played by the 
infinite. To the first stage belongs a concrete individual 
judgment like 2 + 3 = 5 .  To the second, for example, the 
following judgment of hypothetical generality: “If m and n 
are any two concretely given number signs, then rn +n = 
n+m.” I can comprehend the meaning of this proposition 
and convince myself intuitively of its correctness, without 
generating” any other number beside the two concretely 
given ones m and n; i t  is not even necessary to  form the 
number m+n. In  the third stage, the actually occurring 
number signs are imbedded into the sequence of all possible 
numbers, which originates by means of a generating process 
according to the principle that from a given number a new 
one, the following one, can always be formed by addition 
of the number 1. Here the existent is projected into the 
background of the possible, the background of a manifold 
of possibilities which is produced and ordered according to  a 
fixed process but is open into infinity. To  this point of view 
corresponds the method of definition and conclusion by 
means of complete induction. I cannot conceive of a grosser 
misunderstanding than that of making the legitimacy of 
this procedure which refers to  the possible depend, as Russell 
does, on the actual existence of infinitely many objects in 
the real world. I believe tha t  here we strike the root of the  
IC 
1 L. E. J. Brouwer, “Intuitionistische Betrachtungen uber den Formalisniw,” 
Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1928, pp. 48-52. 
A bibliography is included. 
Consistency in Mathematics 249 
mathematical method in general: the a priori construction 
of the possible in opposition to the a posteriori description 
of what is actually given. In  the fourth place, however, and 
this is where according to Brouwer the fault of mathematics 
begins, the theory of sets declared the sequence of natural 
numbers, a sequence open into infinity, to be a closed com- 
plete aggregate of elements existing in themselves. Take the 
definition: “ n  is even or odd according as there does or does 
not exist a number x such that n=2x.” Whoever accepts 
this definition which appeals to the infinite totality of num- 
bers as having a meaning, has passed into another sphere; 
for him the number system has become a realm of absolute 
existences which is “not of this world” and of which our 
consciousness catches a glimpse only here and there. 
The second weak spot in the body of mathematics is due 
to  the objectivation of properties, as Russell emphatically 
pointed out. As long as we deal with the natural numbers 
as objects of investigation, single definite properties such as 
being even, being a prime, etc., occur. The new step is made, 
when a judgment like “18 is even” is no longer subsumed 
under the propositional form, “ x  is even” by the substitu- 
tion x=18, but under the form “ x  has the property y” 
with two empty places, x and y. Properties have hereby 
become objects of a different order, t o  which the primary 
objects, the numbers, can entertain the relation E of “par- 
ticipation,” p&kllr, as Plato says. This step becomes dan- 
gerous only when the terms “all” and “any” are applied 
without restriction to this new realm whose objects are “the 
possible properties.” I n  this sense the second step is already 
included in the first. It is known that  the constructive 
generation of properties establishes a hierarchy of types, the 
Russell types, the neglect of which leads to striking con- 
tradictions. An objectivated property is usually called a 
250 Mathematical Lectures 
set in mathematics; and the real number of analysis is es- 
sentially equivalent t o  the notion “set of natural numbers.” 
Therefore this second step is of decisive importance for the 
foundation of the theory of the continuum as the field of all 
possible real numbers. Usually the word “set” when used 
in opposition to  “property” includes this further convention: 
the sets corresponding to the properties 8 and a’ shall be 
considered equal if every object with the property 8 also 
has the property 8’, and vice versa. I shall here, however, 
leave aside the difficulties connected with carrying this 
identity principle into effect in a rigorous manner. 
The intention of the Hilbert proof theory is t o  atone by an 
act performed once for all for the continual titanic offences 
which mathematics and all mathematicians have committed 
and will still commit against mind, against the principle of 
evidence; and this act consists of gaining the insight that  
mathematics, if it is not true, is at  least consistent. Mathe- 
matics, as we saw, abounds in propositions that are not 
really significant judgments. But we must abstract from the 
content of all its propositions and consider only their formal 
structure when we intend to  show that they involve no 
contradictions. Thus mathematics becomes, in Hilbert’s 
theory, a game with signs and formulas; the formulas, which 
consist of signs, have no meaning which they wish to convey, 
but they are the material of the game of demonstration: 
according to  the rules of the game new formulas are con- 
structed from those already at  hand. The formulas that one 
starts with are the axioms. Among the signs the negation - 
occurs. We would have a contradiction if of two proof games 
which both start from the axioms and are played according 
to  the rules of the game, one ended up with the formula b 
and the other with the contrary one --b. The point is t o  
gain the insight that  this can never occur, and this is an act 
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of cognition and not play. Exactly as we can convince our- 
selves that in a correctly played game of chess a position 
with nine white pawns can never occur. The insight into 
the consistency of the game of mathematics has to  be at- 
tained in the same direct way as tha t  referring t o  the chess 
game. Here the consideration proceeds as follows: in the 
initial position there are eight white pawns. According t o  
the rules a move may decrease, but cannot increase, the num- 
ber of pawns. This ergo stands for the con- 
clusion by complete induction which follows the concrete 
given chess game, move by move. I t  is self-evident for 
Hilbert that  the considerations by means of which the con- 
sistency proof is given in “metamathematics” are throughout 
endowed with the finite character postulated by Brouwer. 
This intuitive thinking in terms of content matter is based 
on evidence and not on axioms; it is conveyed by means of 
language which is necessarily always an uncertain tool of 
communication. On the other hand, mathematics itself has 
no need of any language, since its formulas mean nothing 
and convey nothing. 
But why go beyond the bounds of significant judgments, 
since what lies beyond is totally empty and cognition can 
gain nothing from i t ?  A possible answer to  this question 
appears t o  be that which assigns to  the ideal judgments a 
part similar t o  that played by paper money in economy: 
it does not add new values to  the real ones but it makes 
their handling easier. Whenever, in Hilbert’s formalized 
mathematics a proof yields a final formula which admits 
interpretation as a significant judgment, this judgment is 
true. But I hardly think that this purely technical employ- 
ment of the formulas for the deduction of significant propo- 
sitions would sufficiently justify the method. Still this is 
not a controversy of principle but only a question of econ- 
Ergo . . * 
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omy. Hilbert himself gives the somewhat obscure answer 
that  the infinite plays the part of an idea in the Kantian 
sense, namely that  it supplements the concrete in the sense 
of totality. I hope I am in agreement with Hilbert when I 
interpret this as analogous to  the construction by which I 
imbed the objects which are actually given to  me in my 
consciousness into the totality of an objective world which 
comprises many things that are not immediately present 
to my mind. From t h e  point of view of pure consciousness, 
it is also here not at  all easy to  understand what this sup- 
plementation really means. Certain epistemological schools 
would like to  interpret it as being only a technical artifice 
which enables one to  find one’s way about more easily in 
one’s own consciousness. But there are enough people, and 
I belong to  them, who have the firm belief that  somehow 
the reality of the “you” and of the exterior world embodies 
a higher truth than this solipsistic point of view. Theoretical 
physics justifies and completes the construction of that  inter- 
subjective world we build up in our natural life. The con- 
ditions which prevail here by no means correspond to  
Brouwer’s ideal of a science. An individual assertion, an 
individual physical law has no meaning that can be realized 
by intuition and verified by experience. Only the theoretical 
system as a whole is capable of confrontation with experience. 
And it holds good if concordance prevails, that  is, if on the 
basis of our theories, all indirect determinations of the same 
physical quantity lead to  the same result. 
Let us con- 
sider a definite oscillation of a pendulum; and let us assume 
that its period can be observed directly with an error less 
than 0.1 second, so that periods of oscillation which are 
described by the theoretical physicist as differing by less 
than 0.1 second are actually equal, i .  e., equal for our direct 
An example will make clear what I mean. 
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perception. Still there is a simple way of increasing the 
exactness of observation a hundredfold: one waits until 100 
oscillations have taken place and then divides the observed 
period by 100. But this indirect determination is dependent 
on a certain hypothesis, namely on the hypothesis that  all 
oscillations last the same length of time. This can of course 
be tested by the direct observation with an exactness of 0.1 
second, However, if the theory is used in the indicated 
manner, not this is meant, but instead that the periods are 
absolutely equal, or equal with a hundredfold precision. 
This assumption, just as well as the assertion with regard to  
the period of an individual oscillation to  which it leads, is 
without meaning for the intuitionist who respects the limits 
of intuitive exactness. Still it is possible to  test the hy- 
pothesis in a certain sense: one finds that the period of 
duration of m successive oscillations is t o  that  of n oscilla- 
tions as m is to n, where m and n are large numbers (for the 
test we arbitrarily choose several series of oscillations). If 
I interpret Hilbert correctly, an analogous situation is al- 
ready prevailing in pure mathematics. 
The formalist who abides by his principles must leave the 
question unanswered why he chooses just there axioms for 
the starting-point of his proof game. Also his interest in 
the fact that  no contradiction occurs can hardly be justified 
or can at  most be justified by the following remark. If two 
games lead to the formulas b and -by then, if a is an arbitrary 
given formula, it is possible to  obtain the formula a by two 
additional moves, as final result. It is consequently a p r i o r i  
certain that one can prove any arbitrary formula a and one 
has a simple fixed rule according to  which to  do it. In this 
case the game would be tedious; still it would only be tedious 
if I knew the contradiction. If, however, we consider this 
game of formulas as a symbolic expression of a theory about 
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the world, consistency is involved in the above described 
concordance. Thus we get a more satisfactory answer: only 
a consistent theory can lead to  concordant results when it 
is applied to  experience; the consistency is that  part of the 
concordance which refers only to  the theory itself, the part 
in which the sphere of what is sensually given is not yet 
touched. It is the task of the mathematician to  see that the 
theories of the concrete sciences satisfy this condition sine 
qua non of being formally definite and consistent. 
The development of science has shown clearly that  dif- 
ferent theoretical constructions of the world satisfy the 
postulate of concordance. The decision between the theories 
which compete in this manner is practically cogent for every 
open-minded scientist, yet it is hard to  say precisely what 
brings it about. On the other hand i t  is scarcely up to  us, 
the mathematicians and physicists, t o  account for this ques- 
tion; for in this respect we are at  the mercy of the decisions 
cast in the history of mind, destitute of that  ultimate in- 
sight that  Brouwer postulates. What truth means in physi- 
cal theories is a philosophical or epistemological problem 
rather than a physical one. 
After these general remarks, I should like to go into a 
more detailed discussion of the structure of Hilbert’s formal- 
ized mathematics.‘ As long as the transfinite is excluded, 
only two kinds of signs occur in the formulas; the constants 
like 1, 2;  and the operations. Logical operations are - 
(negation), & (and), V (or), --+ (implies); the first one is 
one-membered, the others are two-membered. The two- 
membered operations = (is equal to) and e (is element of) 
may be considered as logico-arithmetical ones. The opera- 
tions Q (generates out of a the natural number following a) 
‘This description follows, however, more closely a paper of J. v. Neumann. 
Zeitschrift, vol. 26, 1927, page I )  than Hilbert’s own formal system. 
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and Z (Za read: a is a natural number) are purely arith- 
metical one-membered operations. But I should explain 
the sense in which I speak throughout of operations and not 
of relations and properties besides. -+, for example, stands 
for the operation which generates the judgment: “ a  implies 
6” from the two judgments a and 6; 2 is the operation which 
generates the assertion Zn: “ a  is a natural number” from a. 
These remarks are of course merely explanatory and are 
intended to  recall the correspondence between the formulas 
of our formalized mathematics and certain propositions of 
ordinary mathematics which are meant as actual assertions 
of something. 
If we include the infinite, two new kinds of signs become 
necessary: oariabler like x ,  y ,  and integrations. By means 
of the integration 2, the assertion Z,B(x): “There is an x 
for which B(x) holds,” is obtained from the proposition a(x) 
with one variable x.  It is distinguished from the operations 
by the fact t ha t  i t  contains an arbitrary variable x as an 
index and “ties up” this variable in the formula standing 
behind it, Le., deprives i t  of its capability of being substi- 
tuted, exactly as though a definite thing, a constant, had 
been substituted for this variable. We are now in a position 
to  describe in general what a f o rmula  is. Let i t  be written 
in the form of a genealogical tree such that  an operation 
appears as the father of the terms on which it works. Thus 
a 1, 2, . membered operation is always followed by 
1, 2, e . signs respectively; the immediate progeny of an 
integration consists of a single sign, while a constant or a 
variable is always a last member without descendants. At 
the head of the genealogical tree we find a sign of integration 
or operation, and all its branches end with constants or 
variables. We can describe the same thing inductively as 
follows: An individual constant or variable in itself con- 
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stitutes a basic formula. Out of these basic formulas, we 
construct derived formulas according to the two fol- 
lowing principles: (1) If, for example, three for- 
mulas al, az, a3, are given, and 0 is a definite three- dLba3 
membered operation, a new formula is obtained 
by appending al, a2, a3, separately under the sign 0. 
(2) If a formula a is given, and if JL. is an integration 
which carries a certain variable x as an index, a new 
formula is obtained by hanging a under the sign J.. To 
make a homogeneous description possible, we thus, for 
example, write a b instead of a =6.  But afterwards we 
may return to  the habitual way of writing so as t o  prevent the 
formulas from having too strange an aspect. Let us do this, 
and also replace the operational symbol u by the symbol 
+ I  which shall be put after the formula to  which it refers 
( a + l  instead of B ). Furthermore I have to  describe the 
process of substitution. 2 l  or Pl(x) may be, as we always 
assume in the following, an arbitrary formula in which a t  
most one variable x occurs free (not tied up), and b (or c) 
a formula without a free variable, a so-called normal formula, 
then x shall be replaced by the entire formula b everywhere 
in a where it occursfwe. The process of substitution which 
is thus intuitively described, again produces a formula; this 
is the formula we have in mind when we use the abbrevia- 
tion gl(6). The substitution rule would turn out to be more 
complicated if 8 contained several variables free and if free 
variables also occurred in 6. For example, let S, stand for 
integration with respect to x from 0 to  1; then it is permissible 
to replace y in the correct formula 
ZY 
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variable x .  On the other hand, nonsense results when y is 
replaced by a quantity containing x, for example by x itself: 
S , x x = $ x  instead of the correct result S a x = + .  However, 
we avoid these complications by the restriction mentioned 
above. 
German letters are used in general descriptions for means 
of communication; they belong to  the language and are not 
signs in the same sense as 1 or x :  men a t  our game of mathe- 
matics. In  the course of the development of mathematics, 
new signs can continually be introduced; but of course we 
must always make the accompanying remark that  the sign 
is a constant, a variable, a 1, or 2, or 3, - membered 
operation, or an integration. 
Now for the axioms! First the finite logical axioms such as 
( 3  b -+( c + b) . 
It states: if you have any two definite formulas b and c 
without free variables, put them together t o  the formula 
b+(c+b);  you may then use this formula as an axiom. 
Thus ( t )  is not an axiom itself, but a general rule for forma- 
tion of axioms, an inexhaustible source of axioms. It is not 
necessary here to  enumerate the few finite logical axiom rules. 
Logic appears in the mathematics game as playing still 
another entirely different part: i t  furnishes the rules of the 
game. The only rule of moves is the following: If you have 
produced a formula b and a formula b - t c  in which the same 
formula b stands t o  the left of the sign+, you can put down 
the formula c. A mathematical proof consists in forming 
axioms according to  the axiom rules and proceeding from 
them to new formulas by the repeated application of the 
syllogism rule just described. What is obtained in this man- 
ner are provable or rather proved formulas. One can judge 
from the looks of a complete genealogical tree of signs 
whether it is a formula or not. But one cannot judge from 
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the looks of a complete formula whether it is provable. 
This is mainly caused by the fact that  during its inductive 
construction a formula increases a t  every step, while in the 
syllogism two formulas 6 and 6-x combine to  a new one c 
which is shorter than the second premise, so that extension 
and contraction continually alternate in the proof game. 
The axiom rules of equality, in which variables and the 
process of substitution already play a part, are the following: 
6 - b  
(6 =C)+(?l(b) =%(c)). 
They have an intermediate position between pure logic and 
mathematics. In  the third place we have the purely arith- 
metical axioms with which we are well familiar and which 
relate to the notion of natural numbers, as for instance 
(This is an individual definite axiom, not 
a rule for the formation of axioms.) 
21 
Zb+Z(b+l). 
Now comes the transfinite part of logic. With regard to  
there exists,” E,, and “all,” II,, we can for the time being (6 
only establish the following rules : 
( *> 
It is possible to  infer existence from other assumptions, and 
it is possible to derive a particular application from a general 
assertion. But one cannot foresee a t  the moment how we 
can conclude in the opposite direction, how anything else 
can be inferred from the existence, or how a general assertion 
can follow from any other premise. I must describe how 
Hilbert extricates himself from this difficulty. (By the way, 
in our second axiom one can see very well how the German 
letters as tools of communication, so to  speak, represent the 
hypothetically general, whereas the formal sign II, denotes 
the infinite logical product. This may help to  clarify the 
distinction between the two ideas.) Let us take the property: 
a(6) +E,%(x) and II ,%(x)- t%( b). 
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“ x  is honest” to  be 8(x ) .  If, in opposition to  Brouwer, one 
appeals t o  the alternative that  there must either be an 
honest man or t ha t  all men are dishonest, then an Aristides, 
who is the representative of honesty, can be found who is 
established to  be honest if any man is honest. In  the first 
case we choose for Aristides one of the honest men that exist, 
and in the second case an arbitrary one. But in order t o  be 
able to  construct this Aristides, this representative, for 
every property, not only honesty, that  is for every formula 
containing one single free variable x, we imagine that we have 
a divine automaton which accomplishes this task; when 
we insert the property 8 into it, it produces the desired 
representative p z 8  which is sure to  have the property 8 
if there is any individual of this kind. pz is an integration 
sign. If we had an automaton like this a t  our disposal we 
would be free from the troubles caused by ‘call” and “any”; 
but of course the belief in its existence is pure nonsense. 
Mathematics, however, behaves as though it did exist. Tha t  
can be expressed in an axiom rule, and the establishment 
of this rule is legitimate in formalized mathematics, pro- 
vided its application does not lead t o  contradictions. 
~zW(x>--+8(pzlI) ,  w ( P z ( ~ 8 ) ) + n z 8 ( x ) .  
Thus we now add the following rules to (*): 
Naturally they do not accomplish the same as the fictitious 
automaton, for it does not divulge what p z 8  is for a given 
formula 8. Only in special cases a formula like p z 8  = 1 can 
result as final formula of a proof which starts from the 
axioms. 
Now a few words concerning the second difficulty of trans- 
finite character, the objectivation of properties. Z ( x )  being 
an arbitrarily given property, a formula involving the free 
variable x,  the creation and existence of a new thing, the 
‘If %(z) is “ x  is honest,” then, %(pz(-%))+IIz % ( x )  means “If the repre- 
sentative, p,(-%), of dishonesty is honest, then all men are honest.” 
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“set” y, such that the proposition %(x)  is equivalent to 
xey ,  must be expressed by a formal axiomatic rule: 
21, WY)=Wl. 
But it soon becomes evident that  its application irrevocably 
leads to  a contradiction. For classical analysis the limita- 
tion of the argument x t o  the domain of natural numbers is, 
however, sufficient; so that we establish the transjni te  rulc 
for sets in the restricted form: 
2 v  & V x - t ( ( x e y )  =%(x)) l .  
This rule is qualified to  overcome the Russell types, just as 
the transfinite logical axioms guarantee the free manipula- 
tion of “all” and “any” prohibited by Brouwer for actual 
thinking. 
I should now like to  go into a short discussion of the 
consistency proof. The attempts to secure it have revealed 
the vicious circle character of mathematics t o  its full extent. 
Only after we have brought it t o  light completely can we 
succeed in finding the path that cuts through the circles 
and enables us to  gain the insight that, despite the circles, 
no actual contradiction arises. This can be accomplished 
without trouble as long as the transfinite axioms are left 
aside. Under this restriction we are able to  decide whether 
a normal formula is true or false by following its inductive 
construction. This on the one hand makes the indirect 
process of proof superfluous and on the other hand shows 
that  it cannot lead to  a contradiction. I indicate the rule 
by means of which we determine the truth-value T or F, 
true or false, of normal formulas. (A formula which does 
not involve the transfinite symbols 2,, IT,, pz, may be called 
a finite one). a )  We always assign the value F t o  a basic 
formula, t ha t  is, to  an individual constant or a variable. 
( I t  is of course immaterial whether we here decide in favor 
of T or F). p)  A derived formula begins with a sign of 
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b 
integration or operation. I n  the first case-let us be mag- 
nanimous-we shall always assign to it the value T, likewise 
’ -b -  
T F  
F T  
in the second case if the operation sign is not one of the 
following six: - v & --f = 2. The evaluation of derived 
formulas beginning with one of these signs shall take place 
according t o  the following instructions: 
(3) b = c shall have the value T only when the two formulas 
b and c agree completely, and that  again must be verified 
on their structure step by step. (4) A formula Z b  shall have 
the value T if no other signs except u and 1 occur in the 
formula b. This rule constitutes our rational evaluation. 




EveryFnite axiom has the value T ;  
If b and b+c have the value T, c also has the value T. 
If b has the value T, -b has the value F.  
It follows that  a proof which avails itself of finite axioms 
only consists entirely of formulas having the value T. If 
therefore a certain proof of such a kind ends with b, b has 
the value T and -b the value F; it is thus impossible for 
any other proof of the same kind t o  end with -b. 
This argument may give you the impression that you are 
being mocked by a farce. But that  is due to the fact that  
mathematics and mathematical proof are a farce as long 
as the transfinite axioms do not enter into the game. The  
formula b - t c  is always evaluated after b and c have been 
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assigned truth-values. In  the figure of the syllogism, this 
relation is inverted. We see from this that the syllogism 
is powerless without the transfinite axioms; the results it 
produces are much more easily reached by direct insight, 
that  is, by the calculation of the value of the final formula 
as determined by its construction according to  our evalua- 
tion rule. The syllogism would not save mathematics from 
being an immense tautology, but the transfinite is the vehicle 
which carries us beyond the domain of what is immediately 
conceivable. 
Let us now add the transfinite logical axioms. It is con- 
venient t o  use our four axioms separately in building up 
mathematics, but for the consistency proof it is more suit- 
able to replace them by a single one in which their entire 
force is concentrated : 
( a> Wb) - t W P Z W  
and to  use only the transfinite symbol pi instead of our three, 
pz, 2,, H,. It is surely out of the question to arrange the 
descriptive valuation rule in such a manner that  we can 
be assured that all possible axioms formed according to  the 
rule (a) receive the value T;  this signifies that  the insight 
into true and false has here come to  an end. However, less 
than this is sufficient for the consistency proof. We assume 
that two proofs are concretely given which lead to a formula 
b and its negation 4. Let the axioms, given explicitly 
and containing nothing undetermined, which are used in 
these two proofs, be briefly designated by 
I n  order t o  convince oneself that  the situation assumed above 
cannot possibly come to pass i t  suffices to find an evaluation 
which is “correct within 6.” I mean by this that  the rule 
of evaluation shall satisfy the conditions (2) and (3) as 
before, but instead of (1) we shall only require that thc 
( t) 6: 61, 62, * * * , %?&. 
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f e w  axioms of our set 8 shall have the truth value T. This 
“artificial evaluation” will naturally depend on that system 
6. Stated more precisely, our problem is to construct by 
means of a definite universal method a n  evaluation f o r  a n y  
set 1 of arbitrary, but explicitly given, axioms (t), which is 
correct wi thin 8. 
I here consider the simplest case of all: wherever the trans- 
finite symbol p occurs in those particular cases of the rule 
( w )  which are contained in our given set % it shall contain 
the same index x and it shall always govern the same definite 
f inite formula Q (6 of course contains only x as a free 
variable). If you like you may call this property Q “hon- 
esty.” Let b be a given finite normal formula; we try 
whether b can be used as representative of @-as “Aristides;” 
Le., we replace p,&,  wherever it occurs, by b. By this process 
there arises from an arbitrary formula c the “reduced 
formula” c*. We call this “the reduction b” and give to  c 
the value T or F according as the reduced formula c* is 
given the value T o r  F by the rational evaluation. The only 
point which is to be tested is whether the special cases of 
the transfinite axiom rule ( m )  which occur in the system 
are given the value T. They contain, by assumption, p 
only in the same combination prQ; let them be the following 
(A) Q ( b r ) - t & ( p z Q )  (i=l, 2, * ,  h) 
bl, ba, - , b h  need not be finite, but can themselves con- 
tain the transfinite symbol p in the combination p , Q .  
We try for luck the reduction 1 and the corresponding 
evaluation; the reduction symbol A may now refer t o  this 
case. The original mathematical object 1, Adam, shall be 
our Aristides. The formulas (A) are changed into (A) by 
this reduction: & ( $ i ) - t Q ( l ) a  We distinguish between several 
cases. The most favorable is that  in which Adam stands 
the test, in which the finite formula 6(1) is true, i.e., is 
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given the truth-value T i n  the rational evaluation. If, how- 
ever, Q( l) is false, if Adam is a scoundrel, our first unhappy 
choice does no harm provided none of the finite formulas 
(B) 
have the value T :  both sides of these relations have then the 
value F, and then themselves have therefore the value T. 
It may have been absurd to  choose 1 as the representative 
of Q from the standpoint of absolute truth;  Adam is dis- 
honest and in spite of that  there may be honest men. But 
it need not disturb us if none of the few definite people 
i1, &, . - - , i h  with whom we are now dealing in these axioms, 
are not scoundrels. The only case in which our evaluation 1 
does not lead to  our goal is that  in which Q(l) is false but 
one of the finite formulas (B), e.g. is true. In  this case, 
however, we possess a legitimate representative of the 
property Q in il. Thereupon we reject the first process of 
reduction and instead of it perform a second one bl, i.e., 
we replace p z Q  wherever it occurs by bl. So if t he  first re- 
duction chosen at  random fails, its very failure gives us 
automatically another reduction which leads us to  our goal. 
But we only stand a t  the very beginning of the complica- 
tions that can arise. p can combine with different ' U s  to 
pz$ the a's can again contain this transfinite symbol, so 
that  the p's are heaped onto one another. When a certain 
reduction fails, the failure does automatically furnish a new 
reduction which is successful there where the original one 
failed. But  in return for that  it will in general go wrong 
with regard to  those axioms of the set e, for which the first 
one worked; so that on the whole we are not at  all sure 
that  this auto-correction really produces an improvement. 
The point t o  be proved is that  one does not turn about 
in a circle, but that  after a number of steps of successive 
corrections which can be indicated a t  the outset, a reduction 
a(&), & ( 6 2 ) ,  ' * * , Q(6J 
.. 
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is arrived a t  which does not fail anywhere within the given 
finite set of axioms 6.  The  successive corrections can be 
considered as steps in a certain combinatorial game; and 
we assert t ha t  the game comes necessarily to an end after 
a finite number of steps, however we play, our freedom 
being restricted only by the rules of the game. J. v. Neumann 
has proved this theorem of finiteness. We are here dealing 
with a concrete mathematical problem which is not trivial, 
but at  the same time is solvable, and I cannot imagine that  
any mathematician can find the courage to  elude its honest 
solution by means of a metaphysical dogma. 
Thus Mr. v. Neumann succeeded in proving tha t  one 
does not encounter any contradictions in a “restricted 
analysis,” where one handles the sequence of natural num- 
bers as though it were a closed set of objects existing in 
themselves. The justification of the same procedure for 
the continuum of real numbers would require the proof 
that  the restricted transfinite axiom concerning sets does 
not introduce a contradiction into the system of axioms. 
This problem is surely of a much deeper nature, As I hear, 
Mr. Ackermann, a pupil of Hilbert’s, has reduced i t  t o  a 
form similar t o  that  which Neumann obtained for the 
restricted analysis. But he has not yet obtained, and it is 
perhaps even permitted to  doubt whether his combinatorial 
game, which is of course of a rather complicated character, 
really possesses, the requisite property of finiteness. Thus 
the situation remains serious but not entirely hopeless for 
classical analysis. 
